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Abstract. Internet of Things devices have seen a rapid growth and popularity in 
recent years with many more ordinary devices gaining network capability and 
becoming part of the ever growing IoT network. With this exponential growth 
and the limitation of resources, it is becoming increasingly harder to protect 
against security threats such as malware due to its evolving faster than the de-
fence mechanisms can handle with. The traditional security systems are not able 
to detect unknown malware as they use signature-based methods. In this paper, 
we aim to address this issue by introducing a novel IoT malware traffic analysis 
approach using neural network and binary visualisation. The prime motivation of 
the proposed approach is to faster detect and classify new malware (zero-day 
malware). The experiment results show that our method can satisfy the accuracy 
requirement of practical application. 
Keywords: Traffic Analysis, Neural Network, Binary Visualization, Network 
Anomaly Detection, Intrusion Detection System. 
1 Introduction  
The explosive development of the concept of Internet of Things (IoT) is accompanied 
by an unprecedented revolution in the physical and cyber world. Smart, always-con-
nected devices provide real-time contextual information with low overhead to optimize 
processes and improve how companies and individuals interact, work, and live. An in-
creased number of businesses, homes and public areas are now starting to use these 
devices. The number of interconnected devices in use worldwide now exceeds 17 bil-
lion, number that is expected to grow to 10 billion by 2020 and 22 billion by 2025, 
according to a recent report [1]. 
On one side, the IoT devices offer extended features and functionality; on the other 
side, their security level is still low, with well-known weaknesses and vulnerabilities, 
such as easily guessable passwords and insecure default settings [2]. This gives cyber-
criminals the opportunity to easily exploit these vulnerabilities and create backdoors 
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into a typical organisation infrastructure. To ensure their protection against potential 
vulnerabilities, these devices need to be updated and patched regularly; however, given 
they are not perceived as critical IT infrastructure, it is likely that they are less likely to 
be upgraded. Further, given their hardware, some IoT devices may not be patchable and 
the only option is to replace them entirely when they become vulnerable [3].  Beyond 
the convenience or simplicity of patching, insecure Internet-connected IoT devices rep-
resent a security risk. According to a recent report of Symantec, IoT devices will in-
creasingly represent an exploitation target; Symantec already found a 600% increase in 
overall IoT attacks in 2017 [4]. 
Botnets are the most common type of malware when an IoT device is compromised [5], 
either standalone or aggregated to become part of a botnet, capable of launching dev-
astating DDOS (Distributed Denial of service) attacks. Given its uncommon architec-
ture, once a botnet infects an IoT device, it can be very hard to detect the malware. Most 
conventional antimalware tools rely on a syntactic signature for their detection methods 
[6], where the signature of a file is compared to a list of known malicious ones. Thus, 
these systems all require a database with every known malware signature contained 
within it. This is a very time-consuming process and requires already analysing the 
malware or its instruction sequence [7]. Moreover, the signature generation involves 
manual intervention and requires strict code analysis [6], [7], this pushes for enhanced, 
automated analysis. In this paper, we present a novel IoT malware traffic analysis 
method that addresses this issue by using a TensorFlow convolutional neural network 
paired with a binary visualization technique. The main contribution of this proposal is 
an automated malware traffic analysis method that combines binary visualisation of IoT 
traffic with the TensorFlow learning model. The combination is ideal for faster analysis 
of real-time traffic data compared to other approaches and makes it more appropriate 
to detect and analyse unknown zero-day malware. The proposal utilizes sockets to mon-
itor devices network traffic, the Binvis binary data visualisation technique to convert 
the binary content of packets into 2D images, and the TensorFlow machine learning 
method to analyse the produced images. The objective of this analysis is to identify 
malware in the recent packets, based on the assumption that malware traffic tends to 
have a more clustered appearance of its patterns on the produced images whereas clas-
sic traffic presents more consistent and static. Obviously, both sides had anomalies and 
expectations. 
The overall structure of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the prior 
works done in malware traffic analysis and classification. In Section 3, we present the 
methodology of the proposed method using neural network TensorFlow and binary vis-
ualization. Section 4 presents experiment results and analysis as well as a comparison 
with other methods. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks and future work. 
2 Related works 
Detection of malware and its associated traffic is still a persistent challenge for the 
security community. Research in this area is always needed to keep one step ahead of 
the hackers. However, IoT devices are upcoming new technology, especially inside a 
3 
home environment, so anti-malware tools and associated research have been minimal 
compared to normal technologies [2]. Most attempts to detect or prevent malware traf-
fic are performed by firewalls and intrusion prevention systems, for those in a home 
environment there is not much security other than the regular patches [8]. 
Several approaches have been proposed in the literature to detect or mitigate malware 
traffic. Signature-based detection techniques are the most commonly used, however, 
they are unable to detect unknown malware traffic for which there exists no signature 
and involve manual interventions [6], [7], [8]. Machine learning is one of the most ef-
ficient techniques that have been employed to overcome this issue. Over the years, 
many machine learning approaches have been proposed for malware traffic analysis 
and classification. In [9], authors introduced the deep learning method of DBN (Deep 
Belief Networks) to the intrusion detection domain. In the proposed approach, authors 
used the DBN for malware traffic classification. Following the same direction, recent 
work in [10] proposed a malware traffic identification method using a sparse autoen-
coder. In this work, authors proposed a novel classifier model by combining the power 
of the Non-symmetric Deep Auto-Encoder (NDAE) (deep-learning), and the accuracy 
and speed of Random Forest (RF) (shallow learning), leading to high accuracy in mal-
ware detection. However, they both used a hand-designed flow features dataset as input 
data. On the other hand, Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) and recurrent neural 
networks (RNN) are also used in many studies to perform malware traffic classification 
tasks based on spatial and temporal features. For example, authors in [11] transformed 
the network traffic features into a sequence of characters and then used RNNs to learn 
their temporal features. The RNN was then applied to detect malware traffic. While in 
this study the RNNs are used alone and learned a single type of traffic feature, authors 
in [12], authors used CNN to learn the spatial features of network traffic and achieved 
malware traffic classification using an image classification method. The proposed 
method needed no hand-designed features but directly took raw traffic as input data of 
the classifier, and the classifier then can learn features automatically. The CNN is then 
used to perform image classification of the images that were created from traffic sample 
PCAP files. This method has proven the efficiency of malware traffic classification 
using representation learning approach, being very successful in identifying classic traf-
fic and even malware. However, it does not focus on unknown malware traffic. Thus, 
if the neural network is not already trained on the type of attack traffic, it will not be 
able to classify the traffic, or it will falsely categorise it. Moreover, potentially missing 
Zero-day exploits traffic of viruses lets the work down as such threats are possibly the 
most serious ones to a network. 
The study in [13] that also covered IoT intrusion detection used a different detection 
factor to help with the traffic analysis, more specifically the data associated with the 
CPU and memory usage of the IoT device. This is based on the observation that the 
CPU and memory usage tend to increase when a malware component is detected on the 
device. Although the CPU and memory features were effective, they require a lot of set 
up time and reconstruction of a testing network, making the method rather difficult to 
implement. 
In [14], the authors built a similar malware detection tool that focused on malware ex-
ecutables as opposed to traffic. This work also had analysis of binary visualisations 
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through a neural network. The proposed approach uses binary visualisation to convert 
a binary file data into an image, and self-organizing incremental neural networks 
(SOINN) for the analysis and detection of malicious payloads. The limitations of this 
work stemmed from the limited availability of samples, leading to restricting neural 
network training options. 
3 The proposed method 
The proposed IoT malware traffic analysis method consists of three main steps, as 
shown in Fig. 1. The first step is the network traffic collection, through either directly 
sniffing the network or using files containing pre-captured network traffic that can be 
replayed through tcpreplay for the sniffer to collect again. The second step is the binary 
visualisation phase, which takes the collected traffic stored in ASCII (American Stand-
ard Code for Information Interchange) and convert it into a 2D image. In the final step, 
the binary image is then processed by the TensorFlow module, which analyses it against 
its training modules.  
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the proposed method. 
3.1 Network traffic collection 
Packet capturing is the most commonly used scheme to accomplish the goal of network 
data collection [15]. Typically, packet-based collection mechanisms use sniffers to im-
plement network data collection through centralized management such as Wireshark, 
nmap, Airodump, and TCPdump. A sniffer is regarded as a convenient and efficient 
tool to detect traffic and capture packets [15]. In our approach, we proposed a network 
traffic collection method using a Python-based tool [16] which ensures two major tasks 
are accomplished: collection and storage. 
1. Traffic collection: When the sniffer is loaded into memory, it can collect all packets 
that are either traversing the network or are replayed. The used Sniffer utilizes Py-
thon sockets at a low-level networking interface to collect packets. It is worth noting 
that the proposed approach is also applicable for the case of very sporadic IoT traffic 
as it creates profile of what is normal traffic and compare it with abnormal. 
2. Traffic storage: Received data is passed out to a file that contains the data from the 
payload in the packet, this data is turned to hexadecimal so that Binvis can plot it 
into a 2D image in the second step. 
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As shown in Fig. 2, the dataset used two main collection methods, one that the sniffer 
collected of both normal traffic and malware traffic and that used traffic from pcap files.  
All the collected files came from real-world network environments rather than be arti-
ficially generated data. If traffic samples have a large size, only parts of the PCAP file 
is used. Similarly, traffic samples that are too small will only be used on a slower tcpre-
play speed. The collected pcap-based files are added to the dataset and replayed through 
the module tcpreplay using various speeds. 
 
Fig. 2. Overview of the collection process. 
3.2 Traffic visualisation 
In this work, we use a visual representation algorithm of the traffic collected that is 
based on Binvis [17]. This binary data visualization tool converts the contents of a bi-
nary file to another domain that can be visually represented (typically a two-dimen-
sional space) [14]. Binvis represents the different ASCII values by using red, green and 
blue colour classes as shown in Table 1, while black (0x00) and white (0xFF) classes 
are used to represent null and (non-breaking) spaces. 
Table 1. Binvis colour divisions 
Colour Division 
Blue if the ASCII character is printable 
Green if the character is control 
Red if the character is extended ASCII 
Black 0x00 
White 0xFF 
To convert a binary file into a 2D image, its data are seen as a byte string, where each 
byte value is compared against the ASCII table and is attributed to a colour according 
to the division it belongs, as outlined in Table 1. In our approach, the binary file is made 
from network packets collected by the sniffer, these are then converted into a string of 
hexadecimal characters which is later used to create the image of the traffic, using a 
clustering algorithm. The final output of Binvis is an image that represents the features 
of network traffic. The Hilbert space-filling curve clustering algorithm is used in Fig. 3 
and Fig. 4. This algorithm surmounts other curves in preserving the locality between 
objects in multi-dimensional spaces [14], [18], thus creating a much more appropriate 
imprint of the image. This helps the machine learning neural network analysis the image 
for anomalies in normal traffic. 
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Fig. 3. Binary visualisation of backdoor pcap  
 
Fig. 4. Binary visualization of a normal traffic pcap 
3.3 Malware traffic analysis 
In this step, TensorFlow is used to analyze the produced images against its in-depth 
training. TensorFlow is a machine learning system that operates at large scale and in 
heterogeneous environments [19], providing full flexibility for implementing any type 
of model architecture [20]. Moreover, TensorFlow is an effective machine learning al-
gorithm to analyse images and classify them accordingly; it is easy to retrain and learns 
quickly from updates to the neural network [19]. Its outstanding artificial intelligence 
feature is its excellent image recognition ability, which is specifically why it is being 
utilised within this application. The TensorFlow AI could easily detect differences be-
tween the images, including differences that the human eye could not detect [20]. 
The TensorFlow module utilizes a CNN which works like a classic neural network but 
has an extra layer at the beginning called the convolution. The binary output from Bin-
vis is broken up into a number of tiles and, while the machine learning aims to predict 
what each tile is, the AI then aims to determine the combination of tiles that the picture 
is based on. This allows TensorFlow to parallelize operations and detect the object re-
gardless of where it is located in the image [21]. 
The machine learning process is separated into two stages. The first stage is the training 
phase, where the MobileNet module is employed for the retraining element [21]. Mo-
bileNet is a neural network that is very small and efficient, chosen for its lightweight 
element. It is designed specifically to be mindful of the resources it takes up on a device 
or application [21]. In the second stage, the image files are tested against the samples 
of the database to perform classification. 
4 Experimental result 
In this section, we present the performance analysis results of the prototype that was 
implemented based on the methodology presented in the previous section. Accuracy 
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(A), precision (P), recall (R) and f1 value (F1) metrics were used to evaluate the overall 
performance of the proposed malware traffic classification approach. 
𝐴 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑁
    𝑃 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃
   𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁
   𝐹1 = 2 ×
𝑃×𝑅
𝑃+𝑅
   
Where TP is the number of instances correctly classified as good traffic, TN is the 
number of instances correctly classified as bad traffic, FP is the number of instances 
incorrectly classified as good traffic, and FN is the number of instances incorrectly 
classified as bad traffic. 
4.1 Experiment Setup 
The simulation experiments were performed on a virtual machine built on VM work-
station, running Ubuntu 18.0.4. The ISO was not updated during this time to keep pre-
vent technology incompatibility. The dataset that was used in testing, contained a set of 
100 pcap samples, collected from external repositories. It is composed of a mixture of 
30 normal and 70 malware traffic samples. Samples were classified into the unknown 
section if the pcap collected was unnamed or Wireshark testing came back inclusive. 
Table 2 summarizes the percentage of malicious traffic samples of the whole data set. 
Table 2. Malicious traffic sample percentage according to type of malware 
Malware 
type Trojan DDoS Botnets 
Other 
OS scan Keylogger Backdoors 
Percentage 25% 16% 19% 8% 6% 10% 
 
In the training stage, the TensorFlow algorithm was trained by 500 iterations of the data 
set in a static environment. Knowing that the more training, the better the accuracy of 
traffic analysis and classification, however incorrect training samples will result in a 
flawed neural network that can only produce inaccurate results. The minimum training 
requirements are 30 images for each section, which was 30 images for normal traffic 
and 30 for malware traffic. Since the TensorFlow was unable to detect whether traffic 
was good or bad at this stage, the samples used in this stage had to be labelled as being 
good or malware traffic. For the testing process, the set up was a home scenario, with 
the thermometer was chosen for the malware host because it is one of the most common 
home IoT devices and in recent years has been responsible for some of the most devas-
tating attacks [23]. Therefore, it was fitting to use it as the testing scenario. Collected 
sample files were replayed using tcpreplay on the same network interface card to ho-
mogenize the network behavior exhibited by the datasets.   
4.2 Experiments results and analysis  
Several tests were carried out to determine the accuracy of the proposed classifier after 
the addition of more samples, in each test more samples were added to the training data 
for the machine learning to be retrained on. Fig. 5 shows the average accuracy of traffic 
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in the different tests. Four set tests were completed, where the fourth test is the final 
test with the most training samples that were collected being used. It is apparent from 
the four tests that the overall accuracy rate of normal traffic stayed consistent through-
out, only varying from 78% to 90% because most normal traffic was found to have very 
similar characteristics throughout the data stream. This makes the classification of this 
traffic very easy since the training data would almost always be able to match the sam-
ple pcap files against the current traffic being tested. However, even from the start of 
testing the good traffic had a high accuracy rate, which was surprising given the number 
of samples in the training at that point. This is the result of test 1 which has a high false 
positive rate. Knowing that, during early testing, if the algorithm did not recognise a 
binary visualisation then it would classify it as good traffic, leading to the 60% - 40% 
split for malware traffic (see Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 5. Average accuracy of malware and good traffic throughout the 4 sets of tests with com-
parison to number of training data used. 
As shown in Fig. 6, the issue with the high false positive rate was slowly being phased 
out, with the addition of more samples to the neural network throughout the tests, drop-
ping from 40% to 5% by the final set of tests. The addition of more training data mainly 
contained more specific types of malware samples, in the first and second tests, one 
pcap of a Trojan was used to train the neural network, while no backdoor attacks were 
used. This made it near impossible for the algorithm to detect more of these types of 
traffic without more in-depth training. Malware traffic accuracy varied massively 
across all the tests, starting at a low accuracy (60%) but by the final test ended up reach-
ing a good accuracy of 91%. Fig. 6 shows the final stage of testing results. The stage 
has been broken down to show the accuracy of the individual types of traffic, DDOS 
traffic had clearly the best accuracy rate by the end test which even though it made up 
only 16% of the overall traffic it had a clear pattern where its malware samples were 
mainly covered in green pixels. This indicates the use of the control character being 
used over the staple amount, which the machine learning has clearly learned this mali-
cious trait over four sets of tests and uses it to classify DDOS attacks. The algorithm 
had a much higher probability of showing false positives than false negatives, thus false 
negative data was not added to the graph results. In summary, the amount of training 
was the variable that had the most effect on the accuracy of the neural networks. 
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Fig. 6. Final test individual average accuracy for each malware type. 
 
Table 3 shows that the proposed approach achieved an accuracy of 91.32%, which 
meets accuracy of practical use. It has got a high precision 91.67% and recall (91.03%), 
which shows the ability of our approach in classifying bad and good traffic.    
 
Table 1: Results for the last test 
 Accuracy 
(A) 
Precision 
(P) 
Recall 
(R) 
F1 Value 
(F1) 
Test 4 91.32% 91.67% 91.03% 91.35% 
 
4.3 ASCII Characters frequency throughout traffic results and analysis  
As can be seen in Fig. 7, the different types of malware have distinctive features to 
differentiate them. Whereas normal traffic can be spotted by their more even distribu-
tion of ASCII characters or colours across an image, most of the malware samples fol-
low the same pattern of having more predominance of black (Null Bytes) or white areas 
(Spaces) in their samples, however, the DDOS is an exception with its extremely high 
frequency of Control characters. Malware samples do not follow the same pattern as 
normal traffic, the large volume of null and white spaces might indicate that code was 
present in the traffic stream. Null bytes which are normally used in coding to mark the 
end of the string or its termination point [24], could indicate the use of traffic containing 
a back-door attack or similar. Null bytes are also the main factor in injection exploita-
tion techniques used to bypass security filters, the null bytes are added to user-supplied 
data to manipulate application behaviour that called a null byte injection attack [25]. 
Null bytes are also commonly not contained within the default ASCII web request [26], 
an indication of potential botnet usage that is targeting web servers with no intention to 
establish a legit connection. DDOS attacks also had an interesting pattern that did not 
match up with the rest of the other malware, as displayed in Fig. 7, the images had a 
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very high frequency of green pixels, more than any type of traffic recorded. High levels 
of green pixels represent an abuse of the use in control characters [14], attacks com-
monly use control characters to hide data in packets that are malicious in nature [25]. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Average ASCII character frequency between malware and normal traffic PCAPS. 
4.4 Comparison 
It is not easy to conduct a fair comparison among various malware classification ap-
proaches due to the differences between the datasets of traffic used, image visitation 
tools used and target environments. Thus, our comparison will be based on some sig-
nificant features. Table  overviews a general comparison between our approach and the 
well-known IDS (Intrusion Detection System) Snort [28] and Suricata [29].   
Table 4. Comparison with other methods 
Features Malware squid Snort IDS Suricata 
Low false alarm rate  Yes No Yes 
Lightweight  Yes Yes No 
Protocol Independent  Yes No No 
Raw Traffic input  Yes Yes Yes 
The results from the experiments show that malware squid has a low false alarm rate, 
only beaten by Suricata due to its more modern nature and detection methods. Whereas 
snort has a high false alarm rate due to problems with extracting malware footprints 
from traffic, the means of which its Snort rule set runs off [12]. Malware squid is also 
a lightweight program for one that utilises an AI, this is due to the MobileNet algorithm 
being as minimalistic as possible, which is also similar to the older Snort [29], however 
Suricata Is not lightweight due to its increased memory consumption used in multi-
threading [30]. Both methods use a set rule set to detect malicious traffic, if traffic 
matches these sets it will trigger an alarm [12], Malware squid uses image classification 
so has no knowledge of rule sets making it protocol independent. Finally, all three ap-
proaches can take raw traffic input into their datasets [27], this seems to be a staple in 
IDS detection technologies. 
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5 Conclusion  
This paper proposed a novel IoT malware traffic analysis method, leveraging multi-
level artificial intelligence that uses a combination of neural network paired with a bi-
nary visualization. The method can be used to protect IoT devices on gateway level 
bypassing the limitations associated with the IoT environment. From our initial exper-
imental results, the method seems promising and being able to detect unknown mal-
ware. Moreover, the method learns from the misclassifications and improve its effi-
ciency. Future work would involve the use of more samples for training and testing and 
utilising GPU for binary visualization and CNN classification, and testing the propose 
approach for encrypted traffic as well. 
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